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Abstract—We address the problem of detecting the invasion of
an intruder into a region of interest (ROI) which is monitored
by a distributed bandwidth-constrained wireless mobile sensor
network (WMSN). We design periodic trajectories for the mobile
sensor nodes (MSNs) such that high detection probabilities
are obtained while maintaining the MSNs’ energy consumption
low. To reduce the transmission and processing burden on the
MSNs, we propose an operation algorithm based on two modes,
surveying mode and confirmation mode. In the former, to
efficiently detect the intruder while using little mechanical energy,
we optimize the surveying path such that the sensed area is
maximized. During this mode, each MSN performs local detection
and switches to the confirmation mode if and only if the intruder
is suspected to be present. In the confirmation mode, each MSN
collects further measurements over a predefined duration to
reduce the detection uncertainly. A binary local hypothesis testing
is performed at each MSN and only positive test statistics are
transmitted to the FC where the ultimate decision is taken.
Simulations results show the merits of the proposed two-mode
operation algorithm in terms of detection performance and
energy efficiency.
Index Terms—Distributed detection, intruder detection, mobile
sensor nodes (MSNs), wireless mobile sensor networks (WMSNs).
I. INTRODUCTION
CENTRALIZED detection of a binary event (e.g., thepresence of an intruder) by monitoring a region of
interest (ROI) is one of the most important applications of
wireless sensor networks (WSN) [1], [2], [3]. The sensor node
(SN) may be static (i.e., with no movement capabilities) or
dynamic. Deployed over a field, multiple coordinated SNs
report their local observations-based test statistics to a fusion
center (FC) which combines them to make a global decision.
Different strategies exist depending on whether the SN are
static or dynamic, and on how the local test statistics are
computed and combined at the FC.
First, consider the case of a wireless static sensor network
(WSSN) where multiple coordinated low-cost
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static sensor nodes (SSN) are deployed over a large
ROI to detect an event and estimate related parameters
of interest. Unfortunately, these SSN often suffer from
constrained bandwidth, limited available on-board power
and security issues [4]. Furthermore, the local SSN decision
process (i.e., local detection performance) itself is subject
to various security threats [3], [5], [6], [7]. To deal with
some of these challenges, WSSN assisted by mobile robots
(MR) have been proposed [8], [9]. The SSNs are tasked
with the sensing process while the MR may assist with the
deployment, relocation and localization of (some of) the
SSNs to improve the overall network performance [10] [11]
[12], may act as a cluster head or even a FC [13], or provide
a source of energy to refill the depleted batteries of the SSN
[14].
In wireless mobile sensor networks (WMSN), all sensor
nodes can move. As in WSSN, each mobile sensor node
(MSN) generates a local test statistic and forwards it to the
FC. In the literature, there has been little focus on WMSN
due to its design and operation complexities. It has been
shown that mobility alleviates several issues related to sensor
network coverage and connectivity [15], [16], [17] but many
challenges still remain unmet. The WMSN leverages dynamic
coverage [18] to potentially achieve the same performance as
SSN having much larger numbers of nodes.
The robotics community has shown some interest in the
design of multi-robot systems operating as WMSN for surveil-
lance purposes. For instance, in [19], the authors considered a
single robot system to detect as many intruders as possible in
a certain area. In [20], the authors use reinforcement learning
to devise a decentralized WMSN using a multi-robot system
to survey dynamic changes within a ROI. In [21] the authors
design a motion planning technique to make a team of robots
escort a dynamic target by operating as a mobile virtual
fencing which adapts its shape; in this case, the robots orbit
around the target. Similar problems are considered in [22] and
[23]
To the best of our knowledge, the intruder detection liter-
ature dedicated to WMSN is scarce when compared to that
dedicated to WSSN. Further, most of the existing work on
WMSN for surveillance focus on the interior of the ROI
rather than on the perimeter, and the few papers dealing
with perimeter surveillance are mostly concerned with small
perimeters. In addition, the existing work did not address the
energy efficiency of the surveillance process jointly with the
design of the surveillance trajectories.
In this work, we investigate the performance of a WMSN,
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which is composed of N identical MSNs, on the task of
detecting an intruder within a ROI. The investigation considers
both the energy consumption of the MSNs due to motion
as well as the probabilities of detection and false alarm.
Our objective is to devise a method to optimize the MSNs
surveillance trajectories to achieve high detection probabilities
with low MSNs’ energy consumption. Furthermore, it is highly
desirable to minimize the number of MSNs required to cover
the ROI while maintaining high detection performance since
MSNs are more expensive than SSN. This work takes this
issue into account by aiming to design a WMSN so as to
monitor large areas with a detection performance comparable
to that of WSSNs.
A. Contributions & Organization
The main contributions of our work are:
(i) First, unlike the WMSN surveillance problems found
in the literature, we optimize the MSNs’ trajectories si-
multaneously considering their energy consumption and the
WMSN detection performance. We develop a new method to
optimize energy-efficient MSNs surveillance trajectories for
large perimeters and large number of MSNs. The detection
task is based on an operation algorithm consisting of two
modes: a surveying −mode and a confirmation −mode.
We analyze and quantify the effects of the MSN controlled
trajectories on the system detection performance. We show
that the optimum solution to such mobility control is extremely
complex in general as it requires the joint optimization of a
cost function with respect to many design elements such as the
shape, location and orientation of each MSN’s path, velocity
profile, and local detection threshold. We then propose a sub-
optimum but simple hierarchical optimization approach.
(ii) Second, we derive a practical approximation for the
probability of avoidance and based on this, we propose two
optimization methods for the spatial MSNs’ trajectories con-
figuration, taking into account both the power consumption
used in motion as well as the detection performance. We then
numerically evaluate the proposed system performance and
provide insight into the system design parameters.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section
II, we describe the problem formulation (MSN sensing and
local decision), the intruder and the MSN models. In section
III, we provide an outline for the proposed solution proposed.
Then, the individual behaviors of the MSNs are described in
section IV. The optimization of the MSNs within the WMSN
is treated in section V. In Section VI, we present the fusion
rule used by the FC. In Section V, we discuss the optimization
of the WMSN. Section VII presents simulation results. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section VIII.
B. Notations
p̄ denotes the complement of the probability p; bac and dae
are the floor and ceiling functions respectively; A{X} is the
area of the region X ; 1a is the indicator function so 1a = 1
if the statement a is true and 1a = 0 otherwise.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION & SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper we consider a ROI guarded by a WMSN,
which is composed of N MSNs and a FC (see Fig. 1), and
which is tasked with intrusion detection. For simplicity, we
consider a single intruder that produces a signature signal
detectable by the MSNs. In this section, we first describe the
intruder’s behaviour and then in subsection II-B, we describe




















Fig. 1. Schematic architecture of the communication between the
MSN and the fusion center (FC). Each MSN generates a test statistic
(Tj) by observing the target and can communicate (using [Tj ]) with
the FC only over an energy constrained/bandwidth-constrained link.
A. Intruder
We consider the worst intruder’s behavior from the
WMSN’s perspective: invade the ROI to reach a goal point
pg (unknown to the WMSN and hence modeled as a random
variable uniformly distributed over the ROI) and then escape
from the ROI in the shortest possible time.
Assume the intruder to be omnidirectional. Let ti denote
the time when the intruder starts its invasion to the ROI. Its
position at time t (≥ ti) is:




where v(τ) ∈ R2 is the intruder’s velocity, with speed
(vI(τ) = ‖v(τ)‖2) bounded by vI(τ) ≤ vI ; qI(ti) is the
intruder’s initial position (located outside the ROI).
We assume that the intruder lacks information about the
WMSN. So it is incapable of adapting its trajectory according
to the WMSN state. We also assume that the WMSN only
knows the maximum speed vI of the intruder.
We divide the intruder’s behavior in two phases:
1) Invasion phase: To minimize its time within the ROI,
the intruder moves to its goal pg at maximum speed vI
along the line passing by pg and orthogonal to the ROI’s
perimeter. The entry point qe is the point on the ROI
perimeter which is closest to pg . The intruder’s initial
point qI(ti)is the closest point to qe that: i) lies on the
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line linking qe and pg; and ii) is outside of the region
sensed by the MSNs.
2) Escaping phase: The intruder exits the ROI by moving
on a straight line at maximum speed to qI(ti) (located
outside the sensed region).
For simplicity we neglect the time spent by the intruder at pg .
B. Mobile Sensor Node
The WMSN is composed of N MSNs. For simplicity, we
model the position of the jth MSN (pj(t)) at time instant t
using a single-integrator:




where uj(τ) ∈ R2 is the control signal; pj(ti) is the initial
position of the jth MSN and ‖uj(τ)‖2=vj(τ) its speed.
For simplicity, we also assume that the mechanical energy





As stated previously, the intruder leaves a signature signal
which can be sensed by the MSNs. As in [26], [27], [28], we
assume an isotropic signal power attenuation model, and the
signature signal is assumed to decay with distance according
to a power law. The noise-free signal received by the jth MSN
from the intruder can thus be expressed as:
ã(pj [n],qI [n]) =
√
PI1(‖qI [n]−pj [n]‖≤r)
max(d, ‖qI [n]− pj [n]‖)
, (4)
and the output of the jth MSN sensor’s is:
sj [n] = ã(pj [n],qI [n]) + wj [n] (5)
where wj(n) is a zero-mean white Gaussian noise1 with power
σ2; PI is the power of the signature signal generated by the
intruder; d is the minimum sensing range; r is the maximum
sensor’s range; pj [n] is the discretized version of pj(t), i.e.
pj [n] = pj(n∆s) with n ∈ N and ∆s representing the
sampling period [26], [27], [28]; similar notations will be used
for all the other time-dependent functions in this paper.
The sensor model described in (4) and (5) is a simple model
which captures the main aspects of the sensing process: the
received signal a(pj [n],qI [n]) is saturated if the distance to
the source is smaller than a minimum distance d; the received
noise-free signal a(pj [n],qI [n]) is zero if the distance to the
source is larger than the sensing range r; the signal measured
at the sensor’s output is a noisy version of information-
bearing signal a(pj [n],qI [n]); the additive noise is assumed to
Gaussian and white (which is a good approximation in many
practical scenarios).
Though simple, the adopted sensor model is general enough
to model the basic high level characteristics of many different
1We assume Gaussian noise for simplicity although in practice the noise
may not be Gaussian [31]. Nevertheless we have to mention that this paper
focuses on the design of the MSNs trajectory optimization and that minor
changes can be done to adapt the proposed method to consider non-Gaussian
noise.
types of omnidirectional sensors such as acoustic or electro-
magnetic sensors, and even more complex sensors such as
omnidirectional cameras.
Finally, we denote the surface sensed by the jth MSN at a
discrete time instant n as:
Sr (pj [n]) = {q | ‖pj [n]− q‖ ≤ r}. (6)
III. WMSN OPTIMIZATION OUTLINE
The WMSN is tasked with surveying and detecting intru-
sions into the ROI. In order to extend its operational life-
time, the MSNs must consume energy efficiently (see (3))
while performing their task. In this paper, we propose a
method to optimize the WMSN focusing mainly on the MSNs’
trajectories and behaviour.
The goal is design the WMSN to obtain a high probability
of detecting the intruder while using the MSNs’ energy effi-
ciently. This is an extremely complex problem and so we take
a down-top approach. In other words, we start by optimizing
the individual behavior of the MSNs in section IV and then
optimize the overall configuration of the N MSNs within the
ROI in section V. The latter optimization is performed by first
determining the number of MSNs to assign to each part of ROI
(see section V-A), and then deriving a suitable approximation
for the global probability of avoidance (see section V-B).
One key property of our optimization technique is the
introduction of the probability of intersection concept (see
section V) that will allow us to decouple the optimization of
the MSNs’ trajectories from that of the parameters directly
associated with the detection part of the system, such as the
detection thresholds. This property not only simplifies the
optimization significantly but also allows to reuse the proposed
approach with more elaborated sensor models2.
IV. MSN BEHAVIOUR MODES
We divide the individual behavior of each MSN in two
different operational modes:
• surveying − mode: during this operational mode, the
MSN tracks a predetermined and periodic trajectory
while sensing its environment. We optimize the MSN’s
trajectory to maximize the covered area under energy
consumption constraints. The MSN operates on a low-
energy consumption mode with a reduced processing
capability to increase its operational time (and thus that
of the WSMN). If the MSN’s preliminary local sensing
suggests an intruder’s presence, the MSN switches to
its confirmation − mode to confirm or dismiss this
hypothesis.
• confirmation−mode: this aims to minimize the uncer-
tainty associated with the intruder’s status (i.e., present
or absent). If the resulting decision is positive, it is
transmitted by the MSN to the FC. Then, the MSN
switches back to its energy-efficient surveying−mode.
The FC continuously listens to the MSNs and collects their
transmitted local decisions to produce a global decision on
2If the sensor models are not omnidirectional, the proposed approach can
still be used but the individual MSN behaviors should be adapted accordingly.
4
whether or not an intruder is present in the ROI; details of
this are provided in Section VI for details.
The optimization of the surveying and confirmation modes
consider both the detection performance and the energy spent
due motion. After optimizing the individual behaviors of the




N number of MSNs
NMk number of MSNs for kth ROI side
NPk number of paths for kth ROI side
Mk number of MSNs sharing the kth path
`j length of path associated to jth MSN
cj center of path associated to jth MSN
φj orientation of path associated to jth MSN
vj jth MSN speed during the surveying mode
Λ̃j surveying mode detection threshold for the jth MSN
C duration of confirmation mode
Λj confirmation−mode detection threshold for the jth MSN
Cf sliding window size for the FC fusion rule
K threshold used by the FC
A. Surveying Mode
During the surveying −mode, each MSN follows a peri-
odic trajectory3 in the ROI with period ∆T . For each MSN,
the elements of the surveying mode to optimize are: i) the
path’s shape; ii) the MSN’s location and orientation within
the ROI; iii) the MSN’s velocity profile; and iv) the threshold
used in the local detection. Simultaneously optimizing all of
the aforementioned WMSN’s elements is in general extremely
complex. It is therefore highly desirable to adopt a simpler but
suboptimum hierarchical optimization approach.
We start with optimizing the path’s shape. The WMSN
objective is to detect the intruder efficiently while keeping the
consumption of the MSNs’ mechanical energy low. So, given
a path’s length, the sensed area must be maximized. Assuming
that the sampling period (∆s) is significantly smaller than the
trajectory period (i.e., ∆s  ∆T ), the optimization of the






Pj = {pj(t)|t ∈ [0,∆T ]}
L{Pj} = `j
(7)
where Pj is the candidate path for the jth MSN and L{Pj} is
the length of Pj . Solving (7) is equivalent to minimizing the
distance traveled by the MSN (and equivalently its mechanical
energy consumption) for a given sensed area.
To solve (7), as adopt an approach similar to that of [16].
For a fixed path’s length `j , the optimum shape is a straight
line, see Fig. 2. The boundary of the convex hull of the sensed
region is marked in red dashed line. We will refer to such a
path as the surveying path.
3The trajectory consists of both a path and an associated velocity profile.








Fig. 2. A schematic of the optimum path (blue line) and the boundary
of the sensing region associated to this path (red dashed line).
After optimizing the surveying path’s shape, we determine
the MSN’s velocity profile. Since the MSN’s trajectory is set
to be periodic with period ∆T , the MSN must go back and
forth along the surveying path. Using calculus of variations
[30], we optimize the MSN speed profile to minimize its
energy consumption (3) subject to its motion model (2). The
result is that during the surveying mode, the MSN must move
with constant speed. Hence, in the rest of the paper, we will
consider constant speed for all MSNs when operating on the
surveying mode; so, to alight the notations we will write vj
instead of vj(t).
During the surveying mode, the MSN follows its optimum
surveying path with constant speed while simultaneously sens-
ing its environment, see appendix A. The optimization of the
other parameters of the surveying mode will be considered in
section V.
B. Confirmation Mode
The main objective of the confirmation mode is to confirm
or refute the intruder’s suspected presence arisen during the
surveying mode. So, in this mode, the MSN improves its sen-
sor’s signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) (5) to reduce the uncertainty
about the intruder’s presence hypothesis.
To design the confirmation mode, we first calculate the
sensor’s output power assuming the intruder to be within the
sensing region of the MSN, i.e., Sr(pj [n]). For convenience,
let us define two variables (only used in this subsection and in
Appendix B to describe the confirmation mode behaviour): tji
as the intersection time— the time when the intruder enters
the jth MSN sensing region (i.e., Sr(pj(tji ))) just before the
MSN switches to the confirmation mode; and njd∆s as the
first sampling instant of the jth MSN during the confirmation
mode. Note that njd∆s ≥ t
j
i .
The positions of both the jth MSN and the intruder for
n ≥ njd are :





qI [n] = (∆sn− tji )vI [cos(θ[n− 1]) sin(θ[n− 1])]
T





where r [cos(ωj) sin(ωj)]
T is the intruder’s position relative
to the jth MSN at time tji ; [cos(ψj [n− 1]) sin(ψj [n− 1])]
T
and [cos(θ[n− 1]) sin(θ[n− 1])]T are the MSN’s and in-
truder’s movement directions respectively, see Fig. 3.
For simplicity, we assume the intruder’s goal point pg to
be far from Sr(pj(tji )) (this is reasonable since, in general,
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Fig. 3. jth MSN (black dot) and intruder (green dot) positions at
time tji . In red the sensing range of the MSN. The angles φj and
θ describe the movement directions for the MSN and the intruder
while ωj is the angular position of the intruder with respect to the
MSN at time tji .
the ROI is much larger than Sr(pj(tji ))). This implies that the
intruder’s direction remains constant close to time tji . Hence,
θ[n − 1] is constant, and so we subsequently use θ to alight
notation.
We assume d  r in (4) and also ‖pj(n) − qI(n)‖ ≤ r









‖qI [n]− pj [n]‖2
]
(9)
where the expected value is taken with respect to θ and ωj .




‖qI [n]− pj [n]‖2
]
≥ PI
E [‖qI [n]− pj [n]‖2]
(10)
Using (8) and after some simple algebra we have that:
‖pj [n] − qI [n]‖2





I − 2vjvI cos(ψj − θ)
)
+ 2(n∆s − tji )rvI cos(ωj − θ)
− 2(n∆s − tji )rvj cos(ψj − ω
j) + r2.
(11)
As it will be shown in section V, the MSNs will follow a
path along the perimeter of the ROI. From the description of
the intruder’s behaviour in section II-A, it is evident that the
intruder’s movement will be orthogonal to the ROI’s perimeter
and thus to the MSN’s path. Hence cos(ψj−θ) = 0. Also, we
have that E[cos(ωj−θ)] = 0 and E[cos(ψj−ωj)] = 0 because
the intersection of the intruder with the MSN’s sensing region
can occur during any of the two intruder’s phases (invasion and
escaping phases) with the same probability due to the MSN’s
periodic trajectory and the symmetry of the problem. Hence,
we obtain a lower bound for (9):
PI








I ) + r
2
(12)





) will yield a sub-optimum
but simpler solution to the MSN trajectory design during the
confirmation mode. This is clearly achieved by setting to zero
the jth MSN’s speed; i.e., vj = 0.
We conclude this subsection by noting that the optimum
operation of the confirmation mode is for the MSN to stand
still for C∆s seconds(C is a design parameter to be discussed
later) to confirm or infirm the presence of the intruder. It is
worth pointing out that if the MSN had more knowledge about
the intruder’s behavior and if we take into account the MSN’s
location within the ROI and the sensors’ measurements of the
other MSNs, a more efficient confirmation mode might be be
obtained.
The local detection executed during the confirmation mode
is discussed in Appendix B. If this detection indicates the
presence of an intruder, then the MSN transmits its decision
to the FC. The transmission from the MSNs to the FC are
assumed to be error free (see e.g., [3], [24], [25]).
After discussing the individual surveying and confirmation
modes of the MSNs, we will next discuss the organization of
the MSNs within the WMSN.
V. MSNS CONFIGURATION
To complete the design of the WMSN, we need to discuss
the organisation/coordination of the MSNs and the FC fusion
rule.
Given the individual MSNs’ surveying and confirmation
modes (described in section IV), the WMSN’s performance—
given by the global probability of detection (P gd ) which we
define as the probability that the FC detects the intruder when
it invades the ROI— depends on the MSNs’ trajectories and
the detection-related elements.
The trajectory elements of each MSN are the MSN’s speed
during the surveying mode, and the center, orientation and
length of its surveying path. The detection-related elements
are the local thresholds used by the MSN to switch from the
surveying to the confirmation mode, the confirmation mode’s
duration and the threshold to confirm the intruder’s presence.
We wish to design the WMSN so as to maximize the
global probability of detection (P gd ). However, in order to
simplify the problem and get useful insights, we first decouple
the optimization of the MSN trajectory elements from that
of the detection-related elements. To do this, we design the
MSN trajectories so as to maximize the global probability of
intersection (PGPI ) which is defined as the probability that
the intruder comes within sensing range of at least one MSN
for at least one sampling instant:
PGPI , Pr (∃{n, j} : ‖qI [n]− pj [n]‖2 ≤ r) (13)
with j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
If, and only if, the MSNs used noiseless sensors the global
probability of detection P gd would be equivalent to the global
intersection probability PGPI . The presence of noise in the
sensors degrades the probability of detection. Hence, PGPI is
an upper bound for P gd . We also define the global probability
of avoidance (PGPA) as the complement of PGPI (i.e.,
PGPA = P̄GPI ).
We consider the ROI to be a convex polygon of center c
ROI
and NS sides of lengths {Lk}NSk=1 with mink (Lk)  r. To
further simplify the problem, we constraint the MSNs to fully
cover the ROI perimeter. This will ensure that there is no
possibility for the intruder to get into the ROI without risking
being detected while minimizing the overall total distance
traveled by the MSNs. This will reduce the MSN energy
consumption and will increase the lifetime of the WMSN.
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To achieve this, we constraint the union of all the MSN
paths (denoted as P
MSN
) to have the same shape and orien-
tation as P
ROI
, to be centered at c
ROI
, and also designed so
that the distance between the corresponding vertices and P
ROI
to be equal to the sensing range r, (see Fig. 4).








Fig. 4. Schematic of the MSNs’ surveying paths: the black rectangle
represents the ROI; the blue rectangle represents the MSNs’ surveying
paths; the red and green rectangles represent the outer virtual fencing
and the inner virtual fencing respectively.
In the next section we discuss how to determine the number
of MSNs assigned to each side of P
MSN
. For this, we assume
N ≥ NS . Then, in subsection V-B we discuss the optimization
of the MSNs’ trajectories.
A. MSNs’ Deployment Rule
We will deploy the N MSNs along P
MSN
. The first step is
to determine the number NMk of MSNs allocated to the kth
side of P
MSN
with length Lk. We propose two guidelines to
determine NMk : one MSN per ROI side, which ensures that
all the ROI sides are guarded; and NMk must be proportional
to Lk, which ensures that larger ROI sides are surveyed by
more robots.
For simplicity, in the rest of the paper, we consider a rectan-
gular ROI of side lengths Lk = Lx for k = 1, 3 and Lk = Ly








k = 1, 3. Note that Lx > Ly , see Fig. 4.
Once we have determined NPk ≤ NMk , we divide the kth
side of P
MSN
into NPk different non-overlapping paths. Let
NP be the total number of different paths.
Note that NPk ≤ NMk implies that two or more MSNs
can share the same path. For simplicity, we limit the number
of MSNs sharing one path to two. When two MSNs share
the same path, according to extensive simulations (see results
in section VII), the intersection probability increases if both
MSNs follow synchronized and mirrored trajectories rather
than independent ones. This synchronization is obtained by
ensuring that: i) the initial positions of both MSNs are
symmetric with respect to the path’s center; ii) both MSN
speeds are identical; iii) the MSNs’ directions of movement
are opposite to each other; and iv) when one MSN switches
from its surveying mode to its confirmation mode, the
4Many designs satisfy the proposed guidelines; simulation results show that
these different designs did not lead to significant differences in the overall
performance of the WMSN.
other MSN also switches its behavior mode to maintain both
trajectories synchronized.
After determining NMk we need to determine both {NPk }k
and the number of MSNs per path. According to simulations,
the following heuristic is a convenient way to determine those
numbers to significantly reduce the probability of avoidance:




k /2 and each path of the
kth side surveyed by two MSNs.





If NPk is odd then two MSNs are assigned to each path, except
the central path that is surveyed by one MSN. If NPk is even,
then two MSNs are assigned to each path, except the path
NPk /2 that is surveyed by one MSN.
(iii) if NMk = 3 then N
P
k = 2; two MSNs are assigned to
the first path and one MSN to the second one.
The above procedure is heuristic but it reasonably deter-
mines the number of MSNs per path, the number of MSNs
per side and the number of paths per side.
B. MSN’s Trajectory Configuration
In Section V-A, we considered the problem of the MSNs
deployment. Now, we optimize the MSNs’ trajectories (i.e.,
MSNs speeds and their path lengths and locations) in detail. To
do this, we first need an expression for the global probability
of avoidance PGPA (which is the complement of (13)). So,
given a goal point pg and a configuration of the MSNs, let
us define the events: I(pg) and E(pg) respectively as the
intruder completing its invasion and escaping phases without
being intersected by any MSN. We have that:
PGPA = E [Pr(I(pg) ∩ E(pg))] (14)
where Pr(I(pg)) is the probability of occurrence of I(pg)
and the expected value in (14) is taken with respect to pg
and the MSNs trajectories. Unfortunately (14) is not a suitable
term to optimize because of its high computational complexity.
So, we derive a more suitable and tractable approximation for
(14) to be used in the WMSN optimization. From extensive
simulations we observed that I(pg) and E(pg) are statistically
dependent events. But, for tractability we approximate (14) by
assuming I(pg) and E(pg) to be statistically independent:
PGPA ≈ E [Pr(I(pg))]E [Pr(E(pg))] , P̂GPA (15)




PI = E [Pr(I(pg))] (17)
where PI in (17) is the probability that the intruder completes
its invasion phase without being intersected by any MSN.
We will refer to P̂GPA as a naive approximation for PGPA
because it is obtained by ignoring the statistical dependence
between I(pg) and E(pg). But PI in (16) is still too complex
for analytical or numerical calculation; so we continue our
derivation for a suitable approximation of the global probabil-
ity of avoidance.
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P̄I(`k, ck, φk, vk,Mk|Ck)Pc(Ck) (18)
where Ck represents the event where the intruder crosses the
convex hull of the sensing region associated with the kth path;
`k, ck and φk represent respectively the length, center and
orientation of the kth path; vk represents the kth MSN speed;
Pc(Ck) is the probability that the intruder crosses the convex
hull of the region sensed by the MSN(s) surveying the kth
path; PI(`k, ck, φk, vk,Mk|Ck) is the probability that at least
one MSN intercepts the intruder when crossing the kth path.
First of all, the event Ck is equivalent to the event in which
the kth path is the closest path to the intruder’s goal point pg .
This comes from: the intruder’s behaviour (see section II-A);
the goal point’s pg uniform distribution within the ROI; and
the MSN paths located close to the ROI perimeter. From those
elements we can calculate Pc(Ck) analytically using basic
planar geometry (we omit these calculations because of lack
of space and for the sake of the paper’s clarity).
The probability PI(`k, ck, φk, vk,Mk|Ck) depends on the
particular intruder’s trajectory (which itself depends on pg) as
well as on the position and orientation of the kth path among
other parameters. As opposed to Pc(Ck), trying to calculate an-
alytically PI(`k, ck, φk, vk,Mk|Ck) is extremely complicated
and so numerical calculation is required. However, calculating
PI(`k, ck, φk, vk,Mk|Ck) numerically for each path and for
each iteration of the WMSN optimization process increases
significantly the computational load making the optimization
process computationally too demanding and even prohibitive
in some cases.
To address this issue, we further simplify the prob-
lem by replacing PI(`k, ck, φk, vk,Mk|Ck) with another
naive approximation. This approximation discards some
of the dependencies of this probability on the intruder’s
trajectory and on the path location and orientation but keeps
the dependency on the path length `k, the MSN(s) speed
(vk) and the number (Mk) of MSNs sharing the same path6.
This is done to obtain an approximation which captures the
behaviour of PI(`k, ck, φk, vk,Mk|Ck) but requires much less
computation. We will refer to this new term as the naive local
probability of intersection within the kth path and write it as
PLPI(`k, vk,Mk, vI). We formally define it as follows:
Definition. The local probability of intersection (PLPI ) for
the kth path of length `k when surveyed by Mk MSNs with
speed vk is defined as the probability (under constraints C1
and C2) that the intruder traverses the convex hull of the region
sensed by the Mk MSNs assigned to the kth path and comes
within sensing range of at least one MSNs for at least one
sampling instant.
(C1) the intruder’s entry point follows a uniform distribution
along one of the flat sides of the convex hull of the region
5The approximation comes after neglecting the intersection between the
sensing regions of adjacent paths. This approximation is reasonable if the
average length of the paths is significantly longer than the sensing range r.
6These simplifications will significantly reduce the computational cost of
the approximation for PGPA
sensed by the Mk MSNs associated to the kth path (see the
shape of the sensed region in Fig. 2).
(C2) the intruder moves on a straight line, orthogonal to the
surveying path, from its entry point in one side of the convex
hull to the other at constant speed vI .
The term PLPI(`k, vk,Mk, vI) is calculated numerically in
two sets: one for Mk = 1 and another for Mk = 2. Each set
is calculated for different values of vk and `k with a fixed
intruder’s speed vI and then stored in the form of lookup
tables. This will significantly reduce the computational load
in the optimization process.







Fig. 5. Local probability of intersection (PLPI ) versus the ratio of
the distance traveled by the MSN (vj∆s) over the jth path length
(`j) for one arbitrary MSN.








Fig. 6. Schematic illustration of the sensing hole phenomenon.
In Fig. 5 we observe PLPI(`k, vk,Mk, vI) for Mk = 1
and different values of vj (normalized). The first thing we
note is that PLPI is a strictly increasing function of vj only
in an initial region. We also note that (PLPI) is a periodic




implies the existence of a finite speed vj that maximizes
PLPI(`k, vk,Mk, vI) given that all the other parameters are
fixed. This periodicity will also introduces multiple local
maxima which might complicate the optimization process. To
avoid this we constraint vj as follows:
0 ≤ vj ≤ V (`k,Mk, vI) (19)
where V (`k,Mk, vI) is the first value of vj that produces
a local maximum of PLPI(`k, vk,Mk, vI) given `k,Mk, vI .
Now, because the sensing is performed at discrete instants,
sensing holes appear (see Fig. 6). Depending on the jth
MSNs speed (vj), these sensing holes can vary in size. This
is a reason for the periodicity observed in Fig. 5).
Now after deriving the approximation PLPI(`k, vk,Mk, vI)
we continue to derive a tractable approximation for the global
probability of avoidance PGPA. To do this we replace, in
the r.h.s. of (18), the term PI(`k, ck, φk, vk,Mk|Ck) with
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PLPI(`k, vk,Mk, vI). Then, this approximation for PI ,








P̄LPI(`k, vk,Mk, vI)Pc(Ck) (21)
Using the approximation (20) will yield sub − optimum
solutions for the optimization of the WMSN, but will require
much less computational resources than calculating numeri-
cally (14). As it will be shown in the simulations section P̃I
in (20) constitutes a good approximation for PI . However the
approximation (20) presents a certain degree of error because
we assumed in (15) that I(pg) and E(pg) are statistically
independent (while they are not). Nevertheless, the approxi-
mation (20) is highly correlated to PGPA making this naive
approximation suitable to optimize the WMSN.
We next address the issue of designing the paths lengths
and the MSNs’ speeds. Towards this, we propose two methods
that use (20) as a metric for the intruder’s global probability
of avoidance.
1) METHOD A: The WSN should be able to detect the
intruder with high probability while efficiently using the MSN
mechanical energy. To achieve this, in our first optimization
method we minimize a convex combination of the naive
approximation for the probability of avoidance (20) and the
average motion power (3) spent by the MSN. The first term
determines the network performance in detecting the intruder
while the second term determines the lifetime of the network.
















0 ≤ vk ≤ V (`k,Mk, vI)
(22)
where ∆s/Lx is a normalization constant7; θ ∈ [0, 1] is a
design parameter that determines the importance between min-
imizing the intruder’s probability of avoidance (represented by
its approximation P̃GPA) and minimizing the average power
consumed by the MSNs. When θ = 0, the optimization
problem considers only minimizing the MSN’s maximum con-
sumed power, resulting in the MSNs being still; when θ = 1,
the optimization problem considers only the minimization of
the intruder’s probability of avoidance regardless of the energy
consumed by the MSNs, resulting in a short-life time for the
MSN.
If the probability of avoidance is high, the intruder will
often invade the ROI undetected; the ROI will be unsafe. If
the WMSN life-time is short the network will cease operation
before the invasion of the intruder; the ROI will again be
unsafe. So, in practice it is important to consider both the
intruder’s probability of avoidance and the energy consumed
by the MSNs. This will improve the detection performance and
7This normalization is for numerical convenience because P̃GPA depends
on { vk∆s
`k
}k rather than on {vk}k alone, see (20), (21) and Fig. 5.
prolong the WMSN’s operational lifetime, thus significantly
reducing the probability that an intruder invades the ROI. This
trade-off is very interesting but out of the scope of this paper
and will be investigated in future work.
The constraint on vk is used to eliminate local optima and
ease the optimization. The term V (`k,Mk, vI) is calculated
numerically from PLPI(`k, vk,Mk, vI) which, as mentioned
previously, is stored as a lookup table prior to the optimization.
We remind the reader that the optimization problem above
is solved by considering the path configuration discussed
in section V-A (which also fixes {Mk}NPk=1) and using the
simulated annealing algorithm [29].
2) METHOD B: In our second method, we take a dif-
ferent approach. Our aim is to optimize the configuration
of the WMSN to maximize the network efficiency. We
define the network efficiency as the ratio of the comple-
ment of P̃GPA over the average MSNs’ power spent. The
network efficiency is maximum when all the MSNs stay
still (i.e., when vk = 0 ∀k). To avoid this, we introduce a
penalization term to ensure that P̃GPA approaches a certain
value (a design parameter to be defined after (23)) as close as
possible. So, the objective function to be optimized is:



















where both g > 0 and Pref are the design parameters. The
first term in (23) is the network efficiency while the second
term is the penalization term. Regarding the penalization term
note that: when g → +∞, the penalization term subtracts
infinity to the optimization target if P̃GPA > Pref but has
negligible effect if P̃GPA < Pref ; when vk → 0 the network
efficiency tends to +∞ at the following rate 1/v2k but the
penalization term tends to −∞ at an exponential rate (see
(20), (21) and Fig. 5) and so F (g, Pref )→ −∞ when vk = 0
∀k. Therefore, the penalization term acts as a soft constraint
on P̃GPA and prevents the MSNs from remaining still. Finally,





F (g, Pref )
0 ≤ vk ≤ V (`k,Mk, vI)
(24)
where g is a design parameter whose value must be sufficiently
large. As before, this optimization problem can be also solved
using the simulated annealing algorithm [29].
We have presented two alternative methods (namely
METHOD A and METHOD B) for the optimization of the
WMSN configuration. In the next section, we present the
fusion rule for the FC.
VI. SIMPLIFIED FUSION RULE-THE LINEAR APPROACH
To reduce the communications burden the MSNs will report
to the FC, at the end of their confirmation mode, only their
positive local test statistic, see appendix B. For simplicity, we
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assume the error-free MSN-FC communications. The optimum
fusion rule [5], [7] requires knowledge of intruder’s parame-
ters, which are unavailable to the WMSN, and also the MSNs
exact locations8 [27]. Hence, we develop a sub-optimum but
simple fusion rule.
The global test statistic at the FC is taken to be the linear
combination of all local positive test statistics received using
a sliding window approach:






where Cf is the sliding window size (a design parameter). The
FC assumes all non-received test statistics to be zero. Then,
the FC makes a final decision by thresholding the global test
statistic Tf (n;Cf ):
if Tf (n;Cf ) < K,decide H′′0 [n]




H′′0 [n] : sj [k] = wj [k] (27)
∀ k ∈ [n− Cf − C, · · · , n− C]
∀ j ∈ {1, · · · , N},
H′′1 [n] : sj [k] = ã (pj [k], pI [k]) + wj [k] (28)
for some k ∈ [n− Cf − C, · · · , n− C]
for some j ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
The hypothesis H′′1 [n] implies the intruder’s presence during
the time interval [(n − Cf − C)∆s, · · · , (n − C)∆s]. Infor-
mation about the intruder or about the MSNs locations are
unneeded. This simplifies the deployment of our proposed
system.
The global probability of false alarm (P gfa) and the global
probability of detection (P gd ) are:
P gfa = Pr (Tf (n;Cf ) ≥ K|H
′′
0 [n])
P gd = Pr (Tf (n;Cf ) ≥ K|H
′′
1 [n]) . (29)
where K is the threshold used by the FC. Clearly, (29) lacks
a closed form solution and so we evaluate it numerically in
the simulations section (see Section VII).
VII. SIMULATIONS RESULTS
As mentioned before, one of the important properties of our
optimization method is that we have decoupled, by introducing
the probability of intersection, the optimization of the MSNs
trajectories from the detection-related parameters. So, in the
first part of this section, we present the performance of the op-
timized WMSN from the perspective of the global probability
of intersection with the methods presented in section V. Then,
in the second part we evaluate its detection performance.
For all the experiments of this section we consider a
rectangular ROI of size 78r × 40r; on single intruder with
speed vI = 0.3r/∆s and sampling period ∆s = 1s.
8This needs the FC to continuously receive the MSNs’ locations; having a
high cost due to the transmission energy and thus making it impractical.
A. Impact of Approximations used in the Optimisation Pro-
cedures on the System Performance
Here, we constraint the MSNs to operate only on their
surveying mode.





Fig. 7. Global probability of avoidance against the number of MSNs
(N ) after optimizing the WMSN according to (22) with θ = 1 and
MSNs synchronized.




Fig. 8. Global probability of avoidance versus the number of MSNs
(N ) after optimizing the WMSN according to (24) with Pref = 0.01
and MSNs synchronized.
In Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, we show the performance of the
system optimized according to METHOD A with θ = 1 and
METHOD B with Pref = 0.01 respectively. To get an insight
into the impact of the approximations related to the global
probability of avoidance imposed during the optimisation
phase (see section V-B), in both figures, we plot PGPA in (14)
(measured by simulations), P̂GPA in (16), PI in (17) (mea-
sured by simulations), P̃GPA in (20) and P̃I in (21). It is clear
that for both METHOD A and METHOD B, our proposed
approximation P̃I follows closely PI which validates this
approximation. However, the approximation P̃GPA of PGPA
aligns well only when the number of MSNs (N ) is small (and
so the path length of the MSNs is large). When N increases
(and so the MSNs surveying path shortens), the approximation
error increases. The non-alignment between P̃GPA and PGPA
is due to the fact that PGPA 6= P2I while P̃GPA = P̃2I (this
is supported by the fact that P̃GPA follows P̂GPA = P2I
very closely). This shows that the events (described in section
V-B) I(pg) (the MSNs failing to intersect the intruder before
completing its invasion phase) and E(pg) (the MSNs failing
to intersect the intruder before completing its escaping phase)
are not statistically independent.
However, as mentioned in section V-B, we constructed
10
the approximation P̃GPA (for mathematical simplicity and
tractability) assuming those events to be statistically inde-
pendent, even though we knew they were not —this is the
reason why we refer to P̃GPA as a naive approximation. We
would like to clarify that regardless of the disparity between
P̃GPA and PGPA, the proposed approximation (P̃GPA) re-
mains always correlated to PGPA and hence its utilization to
represent the behavior of PGPA in the optimization problems
is adequate.
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Fig. 9. a) Global probability of avoidance against the MSNs num-
ber (N ) and b) Maximum consumed power across the network
(maxj(v2j )) against N for a network optimized according to (22)
and MSNs synchronized with the method of subsection V-A.















Fig. 10. a) Global probability of avoidance against the MSNs
number (N ) and b) Maximum consumed power across the network
(maxj(v2j )) against N for a network optimized according to (24) and
MSNs synchronized with the method of subsection V-A.
We now evaluate the WMSN after deploying the MSNs
using rules presented in section V-A and with the MSNs’
speeds and path lengths optimized according to methods A
and B presented in section V-B. In Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, we
observe the measured global probability of avoidance (PGPA)
and the average MSNs power consumption against N .
In Fig. 9 we observe five scenarios: i) MSNs optimized
according to method A with θ = 1 and the trajectories of
MSNs sharing the same path are synchronized according to the
method described at the end of section V-A; ii) Similar to i)
but with the MSNs sharing the same path having independent
trajectories; iii) Similar to i) but with θ = 0.1; iv) Similar
to ii) but with θ = 0.1; v) Similar to i) but with θ = 0.01.
When we compare i) with ii) and iii) with iv) we observe
the benefit of synchronizing the MSNs: when the MSNs shar-
ing the same path synchronize their trajectories the WMSN
improves its performance both in terms of probability of
avoidance and power consumption. This suggests the existence
of other synchronization strategies (at larger scales) for MSNs
having different surveying paths that could further improve
the WMSN performance. The search for such synchronization
strategies will be the subject of future research.
When comparing i), iii) and v), we observe that as θ
increases, the probability of avoidance decreases and the
average MSN power consumption also increases. In practice, θ
values close to 1 would significantly reduce the probability of
avoidance but also consume more energy and therefore reduce
the WMSN operational time; reducing the probability that the
WMSN would be fully operational when the intruder tries
to invade the ROI. Low θ values would reduce the energy
consumption significantly and increase the probability that the
WMSN would remain operational once the intruder invades
the ROI but the avoidance probability would be high. This is
a complex tradeoff that should be investigated in more detail
in future research by taking into account also the energy levels
of the MSNs’ batteries.
In Fig. 10 we observe two scenarios: i) WMSN optimized
according to method B with Pref = 0.01 and ii) Similar to
i) but with Pref = 0.05. In both scenarios the trajectories
of MSNs sharing the same path are synchronized and we set
g = 8000, see (23).
When N is small and P̃GPA cannot reach Pref the perfor-
mance of the WMSN is poor. This is due to the fact that in
practice when P̃GPA  Pref the penalization term in (23),
used in the optimization process, takes extremely large values
which saturate the variables which store the optimization target
value within the computer. As a consequence when we use
METHOD B and P̃GPA  Pref , the WMSN is not really
being optimized. But, when P̃GPA can reach Pref or stay close
then we observe a more reasonable behavior, see N ≥ 24 for
Pref = 0.05 and N ≥ 32 for Pref = 0.01 in Fig. 10. Once
P̃GPA reaches Pref it stays there while the average power
consumption continues to decrease as the number of MSNs N
increases. This maximizes the efficiency of the WMSN while
satisfying the intended value for P̃GPA. Due to the disparity
between P̃GPA and PGPA mentioned earlier, we observe that
PGPA also seems to converge but to a different (higher) value.
Now that we have evaluated the WMSN from the proba-
bility of avoidance perspective, we next evaluate its detection
probability.
B. System Detection Performance
We consider N = 24 MSNs and for the sensor model we
select: PI = 1, σ2 = 0.2 and d = 0.1r.
As previously mentioned, the detection mode duration (i.e.,
C) in (33) is an important design parameter that significantly
affects the system detection performance.
In Fig. 11, we plot the ROC performance for various
detection mode durations (C) and for a fixed detection
threshold (K) in (26). Obviously, there is an optimum value
of C such that P gd is maximized (for all the P
g
fa values). The
detection performance for C = 1 in (33) (i.e., using the 1-
sample local test statistic) is also plotted. This corresponds to
the case where the MSN continuously surveys and performs
the local detection on − fly (i.e., no detection delay is
introduced in (34)). Clearly, by appropriately choosing the
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Fig. 11. Receiver Operating Characteristic against the detection −
mode duration C in (33), the MSNs optimized according (22) with
θ = 0.9, FC detection threshold (K = 1), sliding window size (Cf =
22) and surveying −mode threshold (Λ̃j = 0.5, ∀j).
detection mode duration (C) (i.e., the MSN’s stopping time
C∆s), the performance gain of the proposed detection scheme
is significant compared to the scheme when MSN does not
stop at all.







Fig. 12. Receiver Operating Characteristic against the detection
threshold (K) and surveying − mode threshold (Λ̃j) in (32), the
MSNs optimized according (22) with θ = 0.9 and sliding window
size (Cf = 22).







Fig. 13. Probability of detection (false alarm) P gd (P
g
fa) versus
the detection − mode threshold (Λj) in (34) parametrized on the
detection − mode duration (C), with sliding window size (Cf =
22), detection threshold (K = 1), surveying − mode threshold
(Λ̃j = 0.5) in (32), MSNs optimized according to (22) with θ = 0.9.
We now investigate the impact of the thresholding operation
on the detection performance. In Fig. 12, we plot the Receiver
Operating Characteristics for the proposed algorithm with
decision fusion in (26) against the detection threshold (K)
and surveying−mode threshold (Λ̃j) in (32). Obviously, for
a pair of K and C, there is an optimum surveying −mode









Fig. 14. The P gd −P
g
fa metric versus the detection−mode threshold
(Λj) parametrized on the detection − mode duration (C) in (33),
with sliding window size (Cf = 22), detection threshold (K = 1),
MSNs optimized according to (22) with θ = 0.9.
threshold (Λ̃j) in (32). For example, when K = 1 and C = 3,
the optimum global probability of detection P gd is achieved
for (Λ̃j = 0.9).





fa metrics, respectively, versus the detection − mode
threshold (Λj) parametrized on the detection−mode duration
(C). In Fig.13, we observe that for P gfa = 0, there is an
optimum detection − mode threshold (Λj) for which the
detection probability is maximized. However, trying to further
improve the detection performance would also increase the
probability of false alarm. In general, different applications
require different acceptable P gfa rates. This determines the
upper bound limit on the detection performance (e.g., for
C = 7 and P gfa < 0.2, a maximum achievable detection rate
of 0.65 only is possible).
Fig.14 shows the (P gd − P
g
fa) distance metric against the
detection − mode threshold (Λj). Note that (P gd − P
g
fa)
is convex with respect to Λj . Clearly, there is a unique
detection − mode threshold (Λj) such that the (P gd − P
g
fa)
distance is maximized for all C and Λ̃j values.







Fig. 15. Receiver Operating Characteristic against the sliding window
size Cf in (25) parametrized on the detection −mode duration C
in (33) for the proposed algorithm with decision fusion in (22), FC
detection threshold (K = 1), surveying −mode threshold (Λ̃j =
0.5, ∀j) in (32), MSNs optimized according to (22) with θ = 0.9..
Now, we investigate the Receiver Operating Characteristic
against the sliding window size Cf in (25). From Fig. 15
we note that the sliding window size plays an important role
in the detection. For e.g., selecting C = 3, K = 1, and
for an acceptable probability of false alarm of P gfa < 0.2,
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a maximum detection rate of 0.75 and 0.82 for Cf = 22 and
Cf = 220 respectively is achievable.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered key issues related to intrusion
detection in WMSN. We proposed a new two−mode operation
algorithm for the MSNs, and have shown that by optimizing
the MSNs behaviour we can achieve higher intrusion detection
and lower mechanical energy consumption, thus improving
the network operational lifetime and performance. To make
the optimization problems tractable, we made a number of
approximations and evaluated their impact and their validity
via simulations.
Future work will consider the case of a fully distributed
WMSN, where the MSN collaborate among themselves to
make a global decision without any fusion center.
APPENDIX A
SENSING FOR SURVEYING MODE
Each MSN continuously senses its environment and per-
forms local detection thresholding on its instantaneous sam-
ples. If the test performed by the MSN suggests the presence
of the intruder then it switches to its confirmation−mode.
From (5), the measured signal at MSN j is:
H0[n] : sj [n] = wj [n], (30)
H1[n] : sj [n] = ã (pj [n], pI [n]) + wj [n] (31)
with: E {sj [n]|H0[n]}=0; E {sj [n]|H1[n]}=ã (pj [n], pI [n]);
and Var {sj [n]|H0[n]} = Var {sj [n]|H1[n]} = σ2. Based on
its jth signal sample sj [n], the jth MSN generates a binary
test statistic T̃j [n] as follows:
if sj [n] < Λ̃j , T̃j [n] = 0 =⇒ decide H0[n]
if sj [n] ≥ Λ̃j , T̃j [n] = 1 =⇒ decide H1[n]
}
(32)
where Λ̃j is the local detection threshold during the
surveying mode for the jth MSN.
When the jth MSN suspects that the intruder might
be present (i.e., T̃j [n] = 1 in (32)), it switches to its
confirmation−mode so that a final local decision is taken.
APPENDIX B
SENSING FOR CONFIRMATION MODE
During the confirmation mode, the jth MSN stops for a
time C∆s to maximize its sensor output SNR (5) and reduce
the uncertainty about the intruder’s status. Then, the jth MSN









Then, the jth MSN estimates the binary indicator variable at
time instant (njd + C)∆s:
if yj(n
j
d;C) < Λj , Tj [n
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where (for mathematical convenience) Tj [n] = 0 for n ∈
{njd, · · · , n
j
d + C − 1} and Λj is the confirmation−mode
threshold for the jth MSN. The thresholds used during the
surveying −mode (Λ̃j) and confirmation −mode Λj are
in general different. For n ∈ [njd, · · · , n
j
d + C] we have:
H′0[n
j
d] : sj [n] = wj [n], ∀ n ∈ [n
j
d, · · · , n
j
d + C] (35)
H′1[n
j
d] : sj [n] = ã (pj(n), pI(n)) + wj(n)































Once the one bit test statistic Tj [n
j
d + C] is estimated,
the MSN transmits it to the FC only if it is positive—to
reduce the communications burden and the network energy
consumption—and switches back to its surveying −mode.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Estrin, L. Girod, G. Pottie, and M. Srivastava, “Instrumenting the
world with wireless sensor networks”, in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Acoust.,
Speech Signal Process. (ICASSP), Salt Lake City, UT, United States,
7-11 May 2001.
[2] O. Songhwai, C. Phoebus, M. Michael, M. Srivastava, and S. Shankar,“
Instrumenting Wireless Sensor Networks for Real-time Surveillanc’e”,
in Proc. of the Int.l Conf. on Robotics and Automation (ICRA), May
2006.
[3] E. Nurellari, D. McLernon and M. Ghogho, “Distributed Two-Step
Quantized Fusion Rules Via Consensus Algorithm for Distributed De-
tection in Wireless Sensor Networks," in IEEE Transactions on Signal
and Information Processing over Networks, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 321-335,
Sept. 2016.
[4] L. Zhang, G. Ding, Q. Wu, Y. Zou, Z. Han, and J. Wang, “Byzantine
Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey", IEEE
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 1342-1363,
thirdquarter 2015.
[5] E. Nurellari, D. McLernon, and M. Ghogho, “A Secure Optimum
Distributed Detection Scheme in Under-Attack Wireless Sensor Net-
works," in IEEE Transactions on Signal and Information Processing
over Networks, vol. , no. , pp. , May 2017.
[6] B. Kailkhura, S. Brahma and P. K. Varshney, “Data Falsification Attacks
on Consensus-Based Detection Systems," in IEEE Transactions on
Signal and Information Processing over Networks, vol. 3, no. 1, pp.
145-158, March 2017.
[7] E. Nurellari, D. McLernon, M. Ghogho, and S. Aldalahmeh, “Distributed
Binary Event Detection Under Data-Falsification and Energy-Bandwidth
Limitation," IEEE Sensors Journal, vol. 16, no. 16, pp. 6298-6309, Aug.
15, 2016.
[8] X. Li, R.Falcon, A. Nayak, and I. Stojmenovic, “Servicing Wireless
Sensor Networks by Mobile Robots”, IEEE Communications Magazine,
Vol. 50, Iss. 7, July 2012.
[9] A. Wichmann, B. D,Okkalioglu and T. Korkmaz, “The integration of
mobile (tele) robotics and wireless sensor networks: A survey”, Comp.
Comm. 51 (2014) pp. 21-35.
[10] M. Rajesh, A. George and T.S.B. Sudarshan,“Energy Efficient Deploy-
ment of Wireless Sensor Network By Multiple Mobile Robots”, Proc.
of the 2015 Int. Conf. on Computing and Network Comm. (CoCoNet),
Trivandrum, India.
[11] T. Wang, Z. Peng, J. Liang, S. Wen, M. Z. A. Bhuiyan, Y. Cai,
and J. Cao, “Following targets for mobile tracking in wireless sensor
networks”, in ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, vol. 12, no. 4,
Sep. 2016.
[12] P. N. Pathirana, N. Bulusu, A. V. Savkin and S. Jha,“Node Localization
Using Mobile Robots in Delay-Tolerant Sensor Networks”, IEEE Trans.
on Mob. Computing, Vol. 4, 2005.
[13] C.T. Chang, et al., “Data Collection for Robot Movement Mechanisms in
Wireless Sensor and Robot Networks”, Proc. of the 2016 Int. Computer
Symposium (ICS), Chiayi, Taiwan.
13
[14] U. Baroudi, “Robot-Assisted Maintenance of Wireless Sensor Networks
Using Wireless Energy Transfer," in IEEE Sensors Journal, vol. 17, no.
14, pp. 4661-4671, 15 Jul., 2017.
[15] D. Bonilla Licea, D. McLernon, M. Ghogho, E. Nurellari, and S. A. R.
Zaidi, “Robotic Mobility Diversity Algorithm with Continuous Search
Space”, in 26th European Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO),
Rome, 2018.
[16] D. Bonilla Licea; D. McLernon; M. Ghogho, “Optimal trajectory design
for a DTOA based multi-robot angle of arrival estimation system
for rescue operations”, Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International
Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), pp.
6800 - 6804.
[17] D. Bonilla Licea, E. Nurellari, and M. Ghogho, “Energy balancing
for robotic aided clustered wireless sensor networks using mobility
diversity algorithms”, in 26th European Signal Processing Conference
(EUSIPCO), Rome, 2018.
[18] B. Liu, O. Dousse, P. Nain, and D. Towsley,“Dynamic Coverage of Mo-
bile Sensor Networks”, IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed
Systems, Vol. 24, No. 2, February 2013.
[19] Satoshi Hoshino ; Takahito Ishiwata, “Probabilistic Surveillance by
Mobile Robot for Unknown Intruders”, 2015 IEEE/RSJ International
Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS)
[20] Xin Zhou ; Weiping Wang ; Tao Wang ; Yonglin Lei ; Fangcheng Zhong,
“Bayesian Reinforcement Learning for Multi-Robot Decentralized Pa-
trolling in Uncertain Environments”, IEEE Transactions on Vehicular
Technology ( Volume: 68 , Issue: 12 , Dec. 2019 ).
[21] David Saldaña ; Reza Javanmard Alitappeh ; Luciano C. A. Pimenta ;
Renato Assunção ; Mario F. M. Campos, “Dynamic perimeter surveil-
lance with a team of robots”, 2016 IEEE International Conference on
Robotics and Automation (ICRA).
[22] Alexander Jahn ; Reza Javanmard Alitappeh ; David Saldaña ; Luciano
C. A. Pimenta ; Andre G. Santos ; Mario F. M. Campos, “Distributed
multi-robot coordination for dynamic perimeter surveillance in uncertain
environments”, 2017 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and
Automation (ICRA).
[23] Song Gao; Rui Song; Yibin Li, “Cooperative Control of Multiple
Nonholonomic Robots for Escorting and Patrolling Mission Based on
Vector Field”, IEEE Access ( Volume: 6 ).
[24] S. Marano, V. Matta, and L. Tong, “Distributed detection in the presence
of byzantine attacks," IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 57, no. 1, pp.
16-29, Oct 2009.
[25] A. S. Rawat, P. Anand, H. Chen, and P. K. Varshney, “Collaborative
spectrum sensing in the presence of byzantine attacks in cognitive radio
networks," IEEE Trans. Signal Process., vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 774-786,
Jan. 2011.
[26] D. Li, K. D. Wong, Y. H. Hu, and A. M. Sayeed, “Detection, classifi-
cation, and tracking of targets”, IEEE Signal Processing Mag., vol. 19,
no. 2, pp. 17-29, 2002.
[27] R. Niu, P.K. Varshney, “Distributed Detection and Fusion in a Large
Wireless Sensor Network of Random Size”, in EURASIP Journal on
Wireless Communications and Networking, vol. 2005(4), pp. 462-472, 8
Sep. 2005.
[28] S. Aldalahmeh, M. Ghogho, D. McLernon, and E. Nurellari, “Optimal
fusion rule for distributed detection in clustered wireless sensor net-
works", EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Process., vol. 2016(5),
pp. 1-12, Jan. 2016.
[29] S. Russell, P. Norving, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach,
Prentice Hall, 2003.
[30] D. E. Kirk, Optimal control theory: An introduction. Dover Publications,
Inc., 2004.
[31] S. H. Javadi, “Detection over sensor networks: a tutorial”, in IEEE





Daniel Bonilla Licea received his M.Sc. degree in
communications from the Centro de Investigación
y Estudios Avanzados (CINVESTAV), Mexico City,
in 2011. From May 2011 until June 2012, he did an
internship in the signal processing team of Intel Labs
in Guadalajara, Mexico. He received his PhD degree
in 2016 from the University of Leeds, U.K..Then, in
2016 he also participated into a short research visit at
the Centre de Recherche en Automatique de Nancy
(CRAN) in Nancy (France). In 2017 he collaborated
in a research project with the Centro de Investigacion
en Computacion (CIC) in Mexico. Currently he holds a postdoctoral position




Edmond Nurellari was awarded the Carter Prize for
the best Ph. D. thesis, titled "Distributed Detection
and Estimation in Wireless Sensor Networks: Re-
source Allocations, Fusion Rules, and Network Se-
curity", in the School in the year 2017-18, University
of Leeds, UK. Since April 2017, Dr. Nurellari has
been a faculty member with the School of Engineer-
ing at the University of Lincoln, United Kingdom,
where he is currently a Senior Lecturer/Programme
Leader in Electrical Engineering/Robotics. His re-
search interests includes distributed signal process-
ing, signal processing on graphs, resource allocations and distributed decisions
in WSNs. He has served as an Invited Reviewer for the IEEE Trans. on Signal
and Info. Process. over Networks, IEEE Communication Letter, Springers
Wireless Networks Journal, Springers Digital Signal Processing Journal and
IEEE Flagship conferences. Over the past few years, Dr. Nurellari has served
as a Guest Editor of Special Issue "Smart Agricultural Applications with
Internet of Things" for Sensors Journal, TPC Member for IEEE iSES, and





Mounir Ghogho received his MSc degree in 1993
and PhD degree in 1997 from the National Poly-
technic Institute of Toulouse, France. He was an
EPSRC Research Fellow with the University of
Strathclyde (Scotland), from Sept 1997 to Nov 2001.
In December 2001, he joined the University of Leeds
where he was promoted to full Professor in 2008. In
2010, while remaining affiliated with the University
of Leeds, he joined the International University
of Rabat in 2010, where he is currently Dean of
Doctoral College and Director of IT Research Lab-
oratory (TICLab). He served as Dean of UIR’s Faculty of computer science
and logistics in 2013. He is also currently Director of CNRS-Associated
International Lab (LIA) DATANET, in the field of Big Data. He was elevated
to the grade of IEEE Fellow in 2018, a recipient of the 2013 IBM Faculty
Award and a recipient of the 2000 UK Royal Academy of Engineering
Research Fellowship. His research interests are in signal processing, machine
learning, data science, and wireless communication. He is currently a member
of the steering committee of the Transactions of Signal and Information
Processing. In the past, he served as an Associate Editor of many journals
including IEEE Signal Processing Magazine and IEEE Transactions on Signal
Processing, and a member of IEEE Signal Processing Society SPCOM, SPTM





Mario Eduardo Rivero-Angeles (S’00-M’04) was
born in Mexico D.F., Mexico, in 1976. He received
the BSc degree from Metropolitan Autonomous Uni-
versity (UAM), Mexico, in 1998, the M.Sc. and
Ph.D. degrees form CINVESTAV-IPN in 2000 and
2006 respectively in Electrical Engineering. He is
a professor at the National Polytechnic Institute,
currently at the Center of Research in Computation
(CIC-IPN), Mexico since 2002. He was a Postdoc-
toral Fellow at Dyonisos research project in INRIA
(Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et
en Automatique), Rennes, France from 2007 to 2010. His research interest
includes random access protocols and data transmission in cellular networks,
P2P networks, and wireless sensor networks
